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RECENT DECISIONS
Labor Arbitration-CLAUSE
=a TERmS OF CoLcnvL

AGREEMENT

PRoHIBrrING ARBITRATOR FROM "ADDING TO"

E BARGAmNNG AGREFmiENT PRECLUDES E.XPANSION OF
AS BASIS FOR AWARD. Appellee-

BEYOND EXPpiESs PROVISIONS

employer announced that its twenty-year policy allowing employees time
off with pay to vote on general election days would be discontinued. The
policy had been unilaterally instituted by employer and was not expressly
contained in the then-existing collective bargaining agreement. In later
negotiations for a new agreement each party proposed that the old contract
be reinstated with certain amendments, none of which referred to the time
off with pay voting practice. When it became evident that employer did
not intend to allow its employees time off to vote, appellant-union filed a
grievance which was subsequently submitted to arbitration.' The arbitrator
found that although the voting policy was not expressly contained in the
bargaining agreement, it was an implied provision based on the parties'
past practice, and the employer had the burden of changing the policy
through negotiations with the union. Since in negotiations for the new contract the parties had not agreed to terminate the practice, the arbitrator
ruled that the employer must pay an election benefit to those employees
who worked on election day.2 On motion to vacate, the district court3 held
that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority in ruling that the voting
policy was an implied provision of the collective bargaining agreement. On
appeal, held, affirmed. An arbitrator exceeds his authority if he bases his
award on an implied provision of a collective bargaining agreement which
forbids "adding to" its terms and which does not expressly confer power
to make the award. Torrington Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers Local 1645, 862
F.2d 677 (2d Cir.1966).
An arbitrator's interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement is not subject to judicial review when applied to the merits of a
labor dispute,4 even though the courts may disagree with his interpreta1 Relevant sections of Article V of the collective bargaining agreement provide:
Section .--.. . [A] grievance with respect to the interpretation or application of
any provisions of this contract ... may be submitted to arbitration ....
Section 3.-The arbitrator shall be bound by and must comply with all of the terms
of this agreement and he shall have no power to add to, delete from, or modify, in

any way, any of the provisions of this agreement ....
Section 4.-The decision of the arbitrator shall be binding on both parties during the
life of this agreement unless the same is contrary, in any way, to law.
2 65-2 CCH ARBrrmiON AwAPDs 5990 (1965).
3 Jurisdiction for the federal courts is provided by The Labor Management Relations
Act (raft-Hartley Act) § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964). This section reads, in relevant
part: "Suits for violation of contracts ... may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of its parties ....
" Ibid.
4 E.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960);
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tion. 5 However, the courts have the power0 to determine whether a dispute is
actually arbitrable, 7 and on a petition to enforce or vacate an award, to
determine whether the arbitrator exceeded the authority granted him by
the bargaining agreement.8 In considering the arbitration of a dispute courts
will declare an issue arbitrable unless the parties have clearly excluded it
from arbitration. 9 Moreover, the courts will consider past practices and precontract negotiations to determine whether a dispute is arbitrable under a
particular bargaining agreement. 10 However, in considering the issue of
Minute Maid Co. v. Citrus Workers Local 444, 331 F.2d 280, 281 (5th Cir. 1964).
Courts will also refuse to consider the merits of a dispute in a suit to compel arbitration.
E.g., United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960); Nepco Unit of
Local 95, Office Employees Union v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co., 287 F.2d 452, 455 (7th
Cir. 1961); IUEW v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 82, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), afl'd Per
curiam, 326 F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1964).
5 E.g., Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 220 F. Supp. 319, $25 (E.D.
Tex. 1968); accord, Arnold v. United Air Lines, Inc., 296 F.2d 191, 195 (7th Cir. 1961)
(dictum); In re States Marine Lines, Inc., and Crooks, 13 N.Y.2d 206, 195 N.E.2d 296, 299
(1963) (dictum).
0 See note 3 supra.
7 E.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241 (1962). See generally Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 752 (1952).
8 E.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)
(dictum); H. K. Porter Co. v. United Saw Workers, 333 F.2d 596, 600-02 (3d Cir. 1964); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Hayes Corp., 296 F.2d 238, 243 (5th Cir. 1961).
Statutory provisions also allow vacation of an arbitrator's award if he has exceeded his
powers. E.g., United States Arbitration Act § 10(d), 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1964); N.Y. Civ. PeAc.
LAw § 7511(b)(1)(iii) (1965).
9 E.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960);
UMW Local 12298 v. Bridgeport Gas Co., 328 F.2d 381, 383 (2d Cir. 1964); UAW v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 801, 802 (10th Cir. 1962); A. S. Abell Co. v. Baltimore Typographical
Union, 230 F. Supp. 962, 966-67 (D. Md.), aff'd, 338 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1964).
This reluctance of the courts to interfere with arbitration was given great weight by the
Supreme Court in the famous Steelworkers trilogy: United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior Gulf & Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
Judicial hesitancy has long been urged by textual authority which upholds the role of
the arbitrator in labor disputes. E.g., Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HAv.
L. Rxv. 1482 (1959); Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration,30 RocKY
Mr. L. REv. 247, 258-66 (1958); Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 Mien.
L. REv. 635, 648-49 (1959); Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68
HAIv. L. REv. 999 (1955); Summers, JudicialReview of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through
the Looking Glass, 2 BUFFALO L. Rav. 1 (1952). But cf., Herzog, Judicial Review of Arbitra.
tion Proceedings-A Present Need, 5 DE. PAUL L. REv. 14 (1955); Jalet, Judicial Review of
Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 519 (1960).
10 See, e.g., Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 310 F.2d 244,
247 (9th Cir. 1962); International Chemical Workers Local 19 v. Jefferson Like Sulphur
Co., 197 F. Supp. 155 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
Some courts refuse to consider these issues, stating that the need for their consideration
compels arbitration. E.g., Silvercup Bakers, Inc. v. Strauss, 245 F. Supp. 199, 203 (E.D.N.Y.
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whether an arbitrator had exceeded his authority under a clause prohibiting
him from adding to the provisions of the agreement, the Eighth Circuit has
said" that the authority to make a specific award must be found within the
four comers of the written contract. - - Some courts have indicated that a
clause prohibiting the arbitrator from adding to the agreement does not
affect his authority to hear a dispute, but applies only to his authority to
make an award.13 However, at least one court has said that on a motion
to enforce an award, the only question open to the court was whether the
arbitrator "ruled on a question of contract interpretation,"' 4 and allowed
an award based on an implied provision of the bargaining agreement even
though the agreement forbade adding to its terms.1 5
1965); See Linton's Laundry v. Restaurant Employee's Local 138, 233 F. Supp. 112 (ED.
Pa. 1964).
Although courts will compel arbitration whenever possible, bargaining history will be
considered by some courts in finding that a dispute is not subject to arbitration. See Independent Petroleum Workers v. Standard Oil Co., 275 F.2d 706, 709.10 (7th Cir. 1960);
Local 201, IUEV v. General Elec. Co., 262 F.2d 265, 271 (lst Cir. 1959); Sunnyvale
Westinghouse Salaried Employee's Ass'n v. Westinghouse Ele. Corp., 175 F. Supp. 635,
689 (W.D. Pa. 1959), affd per curiam, 276 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1960).
11 Truck Drivers Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1964).
12 Id. at 563; see Local 2130, IBEW v. Bailey Case S=Cooler, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 394 (E.D.
Pa. 1964). But see Rubenstein, Some Thoughts on Labor Arbitration, 49 MAQ. L REV.
695, 698-99 (1966).
Essentially, there are two conflicting interpretations of collective bargaining agreements.
One, known as the "reserved rights" view, espouses the intrinsic supremacy of management
over the later forming unions-a supremacy which is relinquished only to the extent
stipulated by the labor contract. The other interpretation, known as the "implied obligation" view, maintains that all the issues confronting labor and management cannot possibly be transcribed on paper. Consequently, all those customs and practices that have
become accepted by the employer and employees are considered part of the agreement, as
long as they are not challenged by either side during negotiations for a new agreement.
Obviously, the "reserved rights" concept is favored by management, the "implied obligations" view by labor. McLaughlin, Custom and Past Practice in Labor Arbitration, 18 Asm.
J. (ns.) 205, 222 (1963).
13 E.g., Carey v. General Elee. Co., 315 F.2d 499, 507-08 (2d Cir. 1963); IBEW v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 228 F. Supp. 922, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); IUEW v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 218 F. Supp. 82, 86-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1964).
State courts have reached a different conclusion saying that submitting the issue to arbitration would be "an idle gesture, as no valid award could be made." Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 11 N.Y.2d 452, 184 N.E.2d 298 (1962) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds,

375 U.S. 261 (1964).
A few courts say that a party cannot voluntarily submit a claim to arbitration, await the
outcome, and challenge the authority of the arbitrators to act if the decision is unfavorable. Ficek v. Southern Pac. Co., 338 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1964); accord, Henderson v.
Eastern Gas & Fuel Assodates, 290 F.2d 677, 680 (4th Cir. 1961); cf., United Steelworkers v.
Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 324 F.2d 479, 482 (9th Cir. 1963). Compare Woolley v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.2d 86, 90 (5th Cir. 1957).
14 American Brake Shoe Co. v. Local 149, UAW, 285 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1961).
15 Ibid.
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In dealing with questions of arbitrability and arbitrator's awards arising
under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, the judiciary
has employed a somewhat divergent approach. Courts rule an issue arbitrable
whenever possible; but when considering awards, the courts usually limit
the arbitrator's authority to the express language of the bargaining agreement. The courts' flexible approach toward arbitrability is understandable:
national labor policy favors arbitration as a method of maintaining industrial peace, 16 and the process of arbitration is thought to have a cathartic
value. 17 Thus, the courts are hesitant to rule a dispute non-arbitrable. On
the other hand, the tendency of the courts to limit the arbitrator's awardmaking authority to the express provisions of the bargaining contract is less
comprehensible, and perhaps unrealistic. For example, in the instant case it
seems evident that the court felt that if the arbitrator had been allowed
to interpret the prior voting practice as an implied provision of the bargaining agreement, the arbitrator would have expanded the scope of his
authority beyond the intent of the bargaining agreement. This rationale,
while perhaps valid, does not offset the threat of excessive judicial encroachment upon the arbitrator's authority to arbitrate-a result which the instant
court's decision did bring about. In Torrington the arbitrator had the power
to interpret the bargaining agreement, which necessarily includes the
authority to determine what is contained in the contract. Consequently, the
arbitrator's interpretation of the pre-contract negotiations led to the inclusion of the voting policy as an implied provision of the bargaining agreement. By deciding that the voting policy was part of the agreement the
arbitrator did not add to the agreement, but instead specified what the
agreement was. The Second Circuit, in rejecting the arbitrator's interpretation of the pre-contract negotiations, indicated that the courts, not the
arbitrator, shall determine what is contained in a bargaining agreement.
Clearly, this usurps the function of the arbitrator and tampers with the
merits of the dispute.
Thus the issue becomes one of greater arbitrator freedom or increased
judicial participation in arbitration. It is submitted that the courts should
apply the same standard in determining an arbitrator's authority to make
an award as they employ in deciding whether a dispute is arbitrable. That
is, the courts should allow an award to stand unless the bargaining contract
dearly relieves the arbtirator of the power to make the award in dispute.
If this standard had been applied in Torrington, the court should have
declined to vacate the arbitrator's award since the arbitrator had not been
precluded from making an award by the terms of abritration contained in
the new collective bargaining agreement.
16 LMRA § 701, 29 U.S.C. § 171 (1964).
Gregory, Arbitration of Grievances Under Collective Bargaining Agreements, 1 GA.
L. REv. 20, 26 (1966).
17
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Labor Law-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT-MAINTENANCE EmpLOyS OF
BANK WORKING IN RENTAL OFFICE PORTION or BANK BUILDING ARE PART
OF BANKING ENTERPRISE AND COVERED BY 1961 AmENDrENT.--Savannah
Bank & Trust Co. occupies twenty-two percent of its fifteen story building
and rents the remaining space to various tenants. The bank paid its employees engaged in banking operations the minimum wage required by the
Fair Labor Standards Act,' but refused to pay the minimum wage to its
elevator starter and maids whose duties were limited to services rendered
exclusively in the rental office portion of the building. Therefore, the Secretary of Labor brought an action under section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act to enjoin the bank from violating provisions of the FLSA. 2 The
district court 3 held that the 1961 amendment to the FLSA, which extended minimum wage coverage to those employees covered by an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, did not extend coverage to the bank's maintenance employees
who worked on the leased floors of the building. On appeal, held, reversed.
Maintenance workers, employed by a bank, who work in part of building
owned by the bank which is not involved in banking operations, are part
of the "banking enterprise" and thus are covered by the 1961 amendment
to the FLSA. Wirtz v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 857 (5th Cir.
1966).
Prior to the 1961 amendments to the FLSA,4 coverage of an employee
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964). The general purpose of the FLSA is found in § 202(a),
which reads:
(a) The Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in commerce or
in the production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions
among the workers of the several States; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of

goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce;
(4) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of
goods in commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1964). For a thorough insight into the legislative history of the Act
see Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAw & Co.'rxnw.
PROB. 464 (1939).
In United States v. Darby, 812 U.S. 100 (1941), the Supreme Court held that the FLSA
was a valid exercise of Congressional regulatory authority over commerce. The Fair

Fair Labor Standards Act is hereinafter abbreviated as FLSA.
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (1964). The FLSA provides that employees coming within its
coverage must be paid ceratin minimum wages (§ 206) and overtime pay (§ 207).
3 Wirtz v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 51 CCH LAB. CAS. 42,824 (S.D. Ga. 1964).
4 29 U.S.C. 203(r)-(s) (1964).
The purpose of the bill, as amended, is to strengthen and extend the scope of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, thus implementing the declared policy of the

act to correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate, in industries engaged in
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by the FLSA depended upon the nature of his work as it related to commerce, not upon the nature of the employer's business.6 However, in 1961
Congress extended 7 the coverage8 of the act to include all employees whose
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, labor conditions detrimental
to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency,

and general well-being of workers.
S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961) (hereinafter cited as S. REP. 145).
5 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1964).
"Employer" includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the United States or any
State or political subdivision of a State, or any labor organization (other than when
acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such
labor organization.
Ibid.
6 Under the 1938 act, which was in effect prior to the 1961 amendments, the test
was "to determine whether an employee is engaged in commerce . . . not whether the
employee's activities affect or indirectly relate to interstate commerce, but whether they
are actually in or so closely related to the movement of the commerce as to be part of
it." Rosenberg v. Semeria, 137 F.2d 742, 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 770 (1943).
See, e.g., A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Wailing, 316 U.S. 517, 522 (1942) (dictum). However,
the 1961 amendments extended the coverage of the 1938 act through the use of the
"enterprise" concept. A.B.A. REP., SECrION OF LABOR RELATiONS LAw 116 (1961).
7 One of the major purposes of the 1961 amendment was to extend protection of
minimum wage laws to "4,100,000 additional employees mainly in large retail and service
enterprises which are engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." S. REP. 145 at 1-2.
The exemptions to coverage under the 1938 act which included retail and service
establishments were, for the most part, removed by the 1961 Amendments, 29 U.S.C.
§ 213(a)(2) (1964). For example, the amended act now includes a transit system with a
gross volume of sales not less than one million dollars. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1964) for
this and other enterprises now covered by the FLSA. The Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare stated:
It is plainly appropriate, therefore, to extend to the employees of the retail selling
enterprise the same minimm wage protection that the act now affords to the pro.
duction and transportation employees, who participate to no greater extent in the
interstate commerce carried on in the same goods.
S. REP'. 145 at 43.
It should be noted that many exemptions are still retained under the amended act.
For example, many cleaners and small newspapers are not covered by the Fair Labor
Standards Act. See, 29 U.S.C. §§ 213(a)(l)-213(a) 22 (1964); S.REP. 145 at 27; 12 LAB. L.J.
733-38 (1961).
8 H. REP. 75 (87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1961).
Coverage is extended, subject to specific exemptions, to the employees in the following categories of enterprises engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce:
(1) Any enterprise which has one or more retail or service establishments if the
annual volume of sales of the enterprise is not less than $1 million (exclusive of
excise taxes) (included here is coverage for gasoline service stations);
(2)Any enterprises which has one or more establishments engaged in laundering,
cleaning, or clothes repairing if the annual volume of sales of the enterprise is not
less than $1 million (exclusive of excise taxes);
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employer qualified as an "enterprise" as stipulated by the amendment. 9
The stipulations' o are first, that the bank and its related activities constitute establishments of the same enterprise," and second, that this enter(3) Any enterprise engaged in local transit business if an annual gross is not less
than $1 million (exclusive of excise taxes);
(4) Any enterprise engaged in a local transit in commerce or production of goods
for commerce, excluding categories in 1, 2, 3. or 5, if the annual volume of sales
of the establishment is not less than $1 million;
(5) Any enterprise engaged in the business of construction or reconstruction, if
annual gross is not less than $250,000."
The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce was the basis of the new coverage provided under the 1961 amendment. S. REt. 145 at 96. But the Supreme Court has
extended the commerce clause to include any place, area, or industry which merely
affects interstate commerce. Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that the commerce
clause gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. Gibbons %. Ogden, 22
US. (9 Wheat.) 1, 17 (1824); see The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 387 (1913). In
the Community Power & Light case the court stated:
Congress may ... enact legislation "to foster, protect, and control [interstate] commerce
with appropriate regard to the welfare of those who are immediately concerned as
well as the public at large, and to promote its growth and insure its safety."
In re Community Power & Light Co., 33 F. Supp. 901, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
Thus the establishment of minimum wages by Congress is a valid regulation of interstate commerce. E.g., Morgan v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 52 F. Supp. 617, 619 (S.D. Ga.
1940) (dictum); Andrews v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 30 F. Supp. 380, 384 (N.D. Ill.,
1939) (dictum), aff'd sub nor., Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940).
9 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(3) (1964).
10 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)-(s) (1964). The pertinent provisions concerning an enterprise are
as follows:
"Enterprise" means the related activities performed (either through unified operation
or common control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose, and
includes all such activities whether performed in one or more establishments or by
one or more corporate or other organizational units including departments of an
establishment operated through leasing arrangements, but shall not include the
related activities performed for such enterprise by an independent contractor....

29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1964).
"Enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" means
any of the following in the activities of which employees are so engaged including
employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods that have been moved
in or produced for commerce by any person....
29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1964).
(3) any establishment of any such enterprise, except establishments and enterprises
referred to in other paragraphs of this subsection, which has employees engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce if the annual gross volume
of sales of such enterprise is not less than $I,000,000....

29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1964).
11 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1964). The significance which the "enterprise" requirement
has to the expanded coverage allowed by the 1961 amendment to the FLSA is delineated
in S. REP. 145 at 4041:

The "enterprise" concept as a key to new coverage is by no means a novel one.
This approach was adopted in proposed amendments to the act which were consid-
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prise, which is engaged in commerce, have an annual gross volume of sales

of not less than one million dollars. 12 In determining whether separate
activities of a bank are part of the same enterprise the following are relevant criteria: (1) whether the activities are related, (2) whether they are
under common control, and (3) whether they have a common business
purpose.1 3 While these requirements seem clear, their actual application
in FLSA litigation involving the scope of the 1961 amendment has been
inconsistent.14 Thus, one Federal District Court has held that employees
of a management company, owned by a bank for the purpose of operating
the bank's building, were not covered by the 1961 amendment since the
management corporation were separate from the banking
activities of the
"enterprise."' 5 However, another Federal District Court, in a more recent
decision, has held that the operation of a building owned by an insurance
company and the interstate commerce activities of the insurance company's
home office were part of the same enterprise; thus, all the building's employees were covered under the 1961 amendment.10
ered in 1949 and, was followed by the bill passed by the Senate in 1960 . . .. In
the present committee bill the term "enterprise" has been carefully defined and
delimited and some revision has been made in last year's definition to clarify and
express more accurately its intended scope.
Ibid.

. 12 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(3) (1964). Congress defined "sale" as "any sale, exchange, contract
to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition." 29 U.S.C. § 203(k)
(1964). While the congressional definition of sale is restrictive, the term "sale" is wide
in scope and capable of being liberally interpreted. The need for a liberal interpretation
becomes apparent upon an examination of the legislative history. For example, the
"million dollar test" made coverage dependent on the size of a business. It was a way of
saying that "anyone who is operating a business of that size in commerce can afford
to pay his employees the minimum wage under the law." S. Rat,. 145 at 5. Furthermore,
Congress intended that the method of calculating the dollar volume of sales would Include receipts from all types of services and sales. See 29 C.F.R. § 779.248 (1965); S. Rr,.
145 at 23. Moreover, Congress did not intend to limit "sale" to those definitions quoted
in § 203(k). Congress intended for rents, interests, investments, and dividends to be
covered by the act. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare said,
This section [203(s)(3)] would provide minimum wage and overtime protection
under the act for approximately 100,000 additional employees in such enterprises
as wholesale trade, finance, insurance, real estate, transportation, communications,
and public utilities, and business, accounting, and similar services.
S. RE. 145 at 31. The act often uses "gross sales" in reference to retail or service establishments. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 203(s), (1), (2), (5) (1964). This would indicate that "sale"
should be liberally, not literally, interpreted in order to promote the congressional
purpose.
13 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1964).

14 See notes 15, 16 infra.
15 Wirtz v. First National Bank and Trust Co., 239 F. Supp. 613, 615-17 (W.D. Okla.
1965).
16 Wirtz v. Columbian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 246 F. Supp. 198, 200-06 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
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The legislative history of the 1961 amendment is useful in determining
The report of the
whether banks and office leasing activities are related.
7
Committee on labor and Public Welfare stated,'
The bill's approach is to treat as separate enterprises those businesses
which are unrelated to each other. For example, if a single company
owns several retail apparel stor.s and is also engaged in the lumbering
business, the sales of the lumbering business would not be included in
the annual dollar volume in determining whether the $1 million test
under section 3(s)(1) has been met. The employees of the lumbering
business would not be included in the enterprise even if the $1 million
test were met since they are not engaged in the related activities of
the retail stores.
Within the meaning of this term activities are "related" when they
are the same or similar, such as those of the individual retail or service
stores in a chain, or departments of an establishment operated through
leasing arrangements. They are also related when they are auxiliary
and service activities such as central office and warehousing activities
and bookkeeping, auditing, purchasing, advertising, and other services.
Likewise, activities are related when they are part of a vertical structure such as the manufacturing, warehousing, and retailing of a particular product or products under unified operation or common control for a common business purpose.
It could be argued that operating a bank and leasing offices in the bank
building are two separate and distinct activities. For example, the court,
in Wirtz v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co.,l8 held that the activities of an
office leasing firm and a banking business were unrelated since the bank
was concerned with general banking business while the leasing firm was
concerned with rent and maintenance of offices. But here, the court either
erroneously or deliberately failed to consider the close connections between
the operation of the building and the bank within that building. Indeed,
the activities of the bank and management of the office building appear
inextricably related. For example, the office building provides the bank
premises for its banking activities, as well as future space for possible
expansion. On the other hand, the bank controls the office building activities and provides the building with a substantial income. In light of this
mutual dependency, it seems valid to conclude that the activities of the
two seemingly disparate operations were related. This was the holding
reached by the courts in Wirtz v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co.20 and Wirlz
17 S. REP. 145 at 41.

18 239 F. Supp. 613 (W.D. Okla. 1965).
19 362 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1966).
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v. Columbian Mut. Life Ins. Co. 2 0 In addition, both courts held that the
same factors used in considering whether the two activities were related
also required the conclusion that these activities were performed for a
common business purpose. 21 Therefore, since Savannah Bank & Trust Co.
admitted having common control over both banking and leasing operations, 22 the court in the instant case properly found that the leasing and
banking activities were parts of the same enterprise, since all three require.
ments for making this determination were present.
As reflected by the conflicting opinions of the First National and Colum20
bian courts, the wording of the 1961 amendment is somewhat ambiguous.
20 246 F. Supp. 198 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).

21 See Wirtz v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1966); Wirtz v.
Columbian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 246 F. Supp. 198, 202 (WJ). Tenn. 1965). The Columbian
Mutual and Savannah Bank courts concluded that a common business purpose was
present. Both courts based their conclusion on the very same factors which were relied
on in determining "related activities," namely, business space, investment outlet, and
future space. In effect, court interpretation of "related activities" and a "common business purpose" are synonymous.
22 One of the requirements of an enterprise is that the "related activity be performed
either through unified operation or common control." 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1964). The
legislative purpose in establishing this requirement was to exclude independent businessmen who own a franchise from being covered by the act. The purpose of the requirement
is delineated in a report of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare:
The bill also contains provisions which should insure that a small local independent
business, not in itself large enough to come within the new coverage, will not become
subject to the act by being considered a part of a large enterprise with which It
has business dealings.
The definition of "enterprise" expressly makes it clear that a local retail or service
establishment which is under independent ownership shall not be considered to be
so operated and controlled as to be other than a separate enterprise because of a
franchise, or group purchasing, or group advertising arrangement with other establishments or because the establishment leases premises from a person who also happens to lease premises to other retail or service establishments. For example, a retail
establishment will not become part of an enterprise which operates a shopping
center merely because it rents its establishment from the shopping center operator.
S. REP. 145 at 41-42.
The First National case stated that "common control" was present even though a
"unified operation" may have been absent. The court believed common control was present since the bank owned and operated the Management Corporation. Wirtz v. First
Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 239 F. Supp. 613, 616 (W.D. Okla. 1965). In the Columbian
Mutual case the court found the "common control" requirement since there was only
one legal entity. Wirtz v. Columbian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 246 F. Supp. 198 (W.D. Tenn.
1965). The court in the instant case only mentioned "common control" since the bank
admitted its presence. Wirtz v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1966).
23 Compare Wirtz v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 239 F. Supp. 613 (W.D. Okla.
1965) with Wirtz v. Columbian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 246 F. Supp. 198 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
This ambiguity exists despite the fact that the 1961 amendment was the result of long
and careful studies. S. REP. 145 at 2.
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This ambiguity is corroborated by the fact that the legislative history of
the amendment seems indefinite as to exactly what constitutes a common
business purpose, an establishment, 24 and a sale. Therefore, it appears as
though Congress has drawn obscure boundaries within the terms of the
bill, thus forcing the courts to determine these "requirements" on an ad
hoc basis.25 In light of this fact, it is submitted that the following changes
would attain the broad coverage Congress desired:
(1) Change "annual gross of sales" 26 in section 203(k) to "annual gross
24 The term "establishment" is undefined in the 1961 amendment. However previous
courts have defined an "establishment" as used in other provisions of the act. Generally,
the courts hold an establishment to be a distinct physical place of business. See, e.g.,
A. H. Phillips Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 496 (1945) (warehouse employees held not
exempt); Mitchell v. Gammill, 245 F.2d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 1957) (poultry business operated as single unit); McComb v. Wyandotte Furniture Co., 169 F.2d 766, 769 (8th Cir.
1948) (five stores held to be separate establishments). Since a definition of establishment
was omitted from the 1961 amendments, the Department of Labor issued a bulletin
which stated:
As used in the Act, the term "establishment," which is not specifically defined therein,
refers to a "distinct physical place of business" rather than to an "entire business
or enterprise" which may include several separate places of business. This is consistent with the meaning of the term as it is normally used in business and in
government, is judicially settled, and has been recognized in the Congress in the
This is the meaning of the term
course of enactment of amendatory legislation ....
as used in sections 3(r), 3(s), 6(b), 7(h), 13(a) and 14 of the Act.

29 C.F.R. § 779.23 (1963).
The Columbian Mutual court held that the office building and the home office constituted not only an establishment, but also a functional unity. Wirtz v. Columbian Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 246 F. Supp. 198 (W.D. Tenn. 1965). Some courts maintained that an
indicia of an establishment is its functional unity. See Mitchell v. T. F. Taylor Fertilizer
Works, 233 F.2d 284, 286 (5th Cir. 1956).
25 See A. B. Kirschbaum & Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 523 (1942) (dictum). Unlike
the Interstate Commerce Act, the FLSA contains no provision for an administrative
commission to determine whether a particular employee is within the regulator)' scope
of the Act. Instead the courts themselves are required by the Act to make this evaluation
on an ad hoc basis. Consequently, since the passage of the act in 1938, the courts, in
determining whether an employee is actually engaged in interstate commerce, have been
confronted with intricate problems of statutory interpretation. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
articulates this lack of administrative commission comparable to that provided by the
Interstate Commerce Act:
In this task of construction, we are without the aid afforded by a preliminary
administrative process for determining whether the particular situation is within the
regulated area. Unlike the Interstate Commerce Act and the National Labor Relations Act and other legislation, the Fair Labor Standards Act puts upon the courts
the independent responsibility of applying ad hoc the general terms of the statute
to an infinite variety of complicated industrial situations.
Ibid.
20 Arguments favoring a literal interpretation of "sale" have been rejected in light
of the legislative history of the amendment. See Wirtz v. Columbian Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
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volume of income from the business of such enterprise." Congress clearly
did not desire to establish a narrow definition of sales since it intended
to extend the coverage of the act.
(2) "Establishment" should be defined in section 203 as any distinct physical place of business or any functional unity. "Establishment" sbould be
liberally construed so as to include any "establishment of an enterprise"
which has employees engaged in commerce and meets the million dollar
test.
(3) The concept of a "common business purpose" should be deleted from
the amendment since it and related activities are really synonymous. However, the legislature should expressly exclude eleemosynary, religious, educational, and similar activities of nonprofit organizations from being classified an "enterprise."
(4) "Related activity" should be defined in section 203 as a firm which
sustains or benefits another business. If the legislature defines what constitutes a "related activity," then the judiciary won't have to ascertain the
meaning on the basis of past facts.
According to Mr. Justice Burton the primary purpose of the FLSA "was
to eliminate, as rapidly as practicable, substandard labor conditions
throughout the Nation ...
"27 Unfortunately, the restrictive wording of
the 1961 amendment seems to contradict this purpose as well as the expressed purpose of the amendment, which was to eliminate "fragmented"
coverage 28 under the FLSA. Consequently, the danger is manifest that
courts may construe the amendment conservatively and deny coverage as
did the court in First National. To avoid this possibility legislative terminology should be formulated and promulgated which would insure that
judicial determinations will henceforth effectuate the purpose of the act. 29
246 F. Supp. 198, 204 (W.D. Tenn. 1965) (investment income included under sale); Wlrtz
v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1966) (leasing office is sale of space).
Contra, Wirtz v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 239 F. Supp. 613, 618 (W.D. Okla.
1965). The First National court said,
the section involved in this case calls for an annual gross volume of sales as distinguished from income from a business. It is believed that the common ordinary
concept of sales was intended in § 203(k) and § 203(s)(3) and must be applied by
the Court in this case. It cannot be considered that the rental of space in an office
building constitutes sales as defined as in § 203(k) of the Act.
Id. at 618.
27 Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 510 (1950).
28 S. REP. No. 145 at 31.
29 See Moffat, The Legislative Process, 24 CORNE
L.Q. 223, 231-33 (1939). In essence
Moffat feels that the legislature is more suited to remedy a fault such as that which
exists in the wording of the 1961 amendment since the legislature is more expedient,
perceptive, and accurate than the courts. Furthermore, according to Moffat, the legislature is the superior fact finder and better represents the public view.
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Limitation of Action-TucKFE

Acr-STATtrrE

OF LMITATIONS

NOT

ToLLED DURmG PEm:Ncy OF ADmINISTRATvE PROCEmNGS REQur By
"Disrum" CLAusE iN GovRimrr CoNcRAr.-Appelant entered into

contract with the Government to supply certain manufactured items. A
dispute which arose over an alleged breach by the Government was submitted to the contracting officer and appeal was taken to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals pursuant to a standard "disputes" clause1
in the contract. Upon an adverse determination by the administrative
agency the manufacturer brought suit under the Tucker Act.2 The district
court granted the Government's motion for summary judgment holding
the complaint barred by the six year statute of limitations3 suspending the
government's sovereign ifumunity notwithstanding appellant's institution
of administrative proceedings within the statutory period.4 On appeal,
'Such a clause is required in government fixed-price supply contracts, 32 C.F.RL
§ 7.103-12 (1958). The clause in the instant case was as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concerning a question of
fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to writing and mail
or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor. Within 30 days from the
date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor may appeal by mailing or otherwise
furnishing to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the Secretar)
and the decision of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative for the hearing of such appeals shall, unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction
to have been fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily
to imply bad faith, be final and conclusive; provided that, if no such appeal is
taken, the decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and conclusive. In connection with any appeal proceeding under this clause, the Contractor shall be
afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of its appeal.
Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed diligently
with the performance of the contract and in accordance with the Contracting Officer's
decision.
Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 363 F.2d 407, 408, n.2 (2d Cir. 1966), petition for
cert. granted, 35 U.S.L. IV=n 3124 (US. Oct. 11, 1966) (No. 371).
2 Tucker Act, 28 US.C. § 1346(a) (1887), provides:

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of
Claims of:...

(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding $10,000
in amount, founded either upon the Constitution or any Act of Congress, or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract
with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort.
3 The Tucker Act was a comprehensive statute which included, among other provisions, a predecessor provision to the present 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1964), which now reads:
(a) Every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless
the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues. The
action of any person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim
accrues may be commenced within three years after the disability ceases
4 The final delivery of the products and presentation of the final invoice i-as made
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held, affirmed. The Tucker Act's period of limitations is not tolled during
the pendency of administrative proceedings required by the "disputes"
clause in a Government contract." Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States,
363 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1966) (5-to-4 decision), petition for cert. granted, 35
U.S.L. WEEK 3124 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1966) (No. 871).
Statutes of limitation are practical and pragmatic devices0 to limit the
time in which an action may be maintained. In certain situations, however, other considerations may require that the running of the statute be
tolled.8 A distinction has been made between statutes which merely preon December 14, 1956. On October 4, 1961, appellant's counsel wrote the Contracting
Officer and demanded a refund, which was denied; the ASBCA confirmed the Contracting Officer's decision on February 28, 1963. Appellant brought suit on July 31, 1968,
five months after the ASBCA decision and over six years after performance under the
contract.
5 The court also affirmed a holding by the district court that the cause of action arose
at the time of breach and not when the claim was administratively disallowed. McMahon
v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, rehearing denied, 342 U.S. 899 (1951), was cited as dcterminative of the issue. McMahon involved a claim by a seaman against the United
States for injuries and maintenance and cure which had been administratively disallowed.
Prior to this case the circuits had rendered conflicting decisions as to whether the date
of the injury or the date of the disallowance of the claim commenced the period of limitation. Compare Thurston v. United States, 179 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1950), with Rodincinc
v. United States, 175 F.2d 479 (3rd Cir. 1949). The Supreme Court rejected both the
contention that the seaman could not sue until disallowance and that he had no cause
of action until then, holding that the period of limitation begins to run from the date
of the injury, not from the time of disallowance. McMahon v. United States, supra at
27.
The Court of Claims, however, has refused to apply the above rationale to stilts
against the Government under the Tucker Act distinguishing McMahon as ". . . a Suits
in Admiralty Act decision which itself rested on the particular history of that statute."
Nager Elec. Co. v. United States, 368 F.2d 847, 863 (Ct. Cl. 1966). The court in Nager,
on facts substantially similar to those of the instant case held that for matters required
to be processed under a mandatory "disputes" provision, the judicial claim does not
ripen so as to trigger limitations until the decision of the administrative board. Id. at
854; accord, Conn v. United States, 336 F.2d 1019 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
6 Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, rehearing denied, 325 U.S. 896
(1945).
7 Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 621, 623 (1885) (dictum). See, e.g., United States v.
Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 72 (1956) (dictum); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Orr,
319 F.2d 612, 616 (5th Cir. 1963) (dictum).
8 E.g., Weller v. Dickinson, 314 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1963) (dictum) (imprisonment
of person in whom cause of action resides); Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 178
F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1949) (fraud); Osbourne v. United States, 164 F.2d 767 (2d Cir.
1947) (war); Nelson v. Browning, 391 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1965) (infancy); Livingston v.
Meyers, 6 I1. 2d 325, 129 N.E.2d 12 (1955) (physical absence of defendant). See generally
Note, 63 HARV. L. Riv. 1177 (1950).
The typical state statute of limitation contains a provision for tolling when the person
in whom the cause of action resides is under a disability at the time the cause of action
accrues. The legal disabilities usually provided for are infancy, insanity, and imprison-
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scribe a limitation on existing rights9 and statutes which prescribe limitations and also confer a cause of action.' 0 It was formerly held in statutes
of the latter variety that the time limitation was an inherent qualification
of the right created" and as such an essential condition from which no
deviation could be permitted?2 This reasoning has been applied to suits
involving waiver of sovereign immunity.13 In such cases the time limita4
tion is held to be a statutory restriction upon the jurisdiction of the cour
and may not be tolled. 15 The Supreme Court, however, has recently disment for a term less than life. Littell, A Comparison of the Statutes of Limitations, 21
IND. IJ. 23, 35 (1945); see id., 3941; Blume and Geage, Limitations and the Federal
Courts, 49 Mxc. L. REv. 937, 974-78, 1003-04 (1951). For a compilation of the general

provisions of state statutes of limitation, see Mix, State Statutes of Limitation: Contrasted
and Compared, 3 Rocky MT. L. REv. 106, 118-29 (1931); Segal, Digest of Limitations in
Personal Injury, Death, and Allied Actions, 8 PRAc. LAw 71, 76-87 (1962).
9 A general statute of limitations extinguishes only the remedy and does not affect
the right. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 618 (1895) (dictum). A claim barred by
such a statute ceases to be a legal obligation and becomes only a moral one, which the
courts will not enforce. See id. at 620.
10 Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152, 155-56 (2d Cir. 1955); wee Engle
v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1926); Frabutt v. New York C. & St. L. IR. 84 F. Supp.
460, 464 (W.D. Pa. 1949).
The substantive-procedural dichotomy seems to have originated with the much relied
on dictum of The Harrisburg, 119 US. 199, 214 (1886). Note, 72 YAME L.J. 600, 604 nnA0,
41 (1963). It is questionable whether the court intended the distinction to be extended
beyond a conflict of laws application. Id. n.40. For the current conflict of laws formulation of this principle, see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICr or LAws § 605 (1934).
11 See, e.g., Bell v. Wabash Ry., 58 F.2d 569, 571 (8th Cir. 1932); American R.R. v.
Coronas, 230 Fed. 545, 546 (Ist Cir. 1916); Eberhart v. United States, 204 Fed. 884, 890
(8th Cir. 1913) (concurring opinion). Judge Sandborn's statement in Eberhart is t)pical:
"An act of Congress which at the same time and in itself authorizes or creates a new
liability and prescribes the limitation thereof and of its enforcement, makes those limitations conditions of the liability itself." Id. at 891.
12 See, e.g., Damiano v. Pennsylvania
-RR., 161 F.2d 534 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 762 (1947); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 108 F.2d 762, 763 (2d Cir. 1940). The
Damiano court in referring to the time limitation enacted in the Federal Employers Liability Act said: "Such statutes may not be tolled after the manner of statutes of limitation, even for fraud or concealment by the defendant which prevent the plaintiff from
bringing the action within time." Damiano v. Pennsylvania
IR., supra at 535. See
generally, Annot., 15 A.L.RL2d 500 (1951).
13 E.g., Sgambati v. United States, 172 F.2d 297, 298 (1957), cert. denied, 337 US. 938
(1949); see Finn v. United States, 123 US. 227, 232 (1887), appeal dismissed, 145 U.S.
658 (1892); Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 931, 933 (D. Del. 1955).
14 E.g., Kendall v. United States, 107 US. 123, 125 (1883); Isthmian S.S. Co. Y. United
States, 302 F.2d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1962); Edwards v. United States, 163 F.2d 268, 269 (9th
Cir. 1947).
'5 Burch v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 476, 480 (E.D. Va.), ajTJd, 261 F.2d 418 (4th
Cir. 1958); see Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 273 (1957); Sgambati v. United
States, supra note 13. In Soriano, Mr. Justice Clark in referring to tolling by implication
stated: "TMlis Court has long decided that limitations and conditions upon which the
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credited the so-called "substantive" statute view'8 and indicated that the
basic inquiry is whether congressional purpose is effectuated by tolling
the statute in given circumstances.Y Thus at least one circuit has held
that the statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of adminis.
trative proceedings required by a Government contract.' 8
An important question posed in the instant decision is whether Congress
in the creation of the right of action meant to attach a condition which
must be construed as absolute under all circumstances, in the absence of
statutory exemption. This problem was at first resolved in favor of a strict
construction allowing no exception by implication.'8 The reasoning advanced in support of such a result embodied the substantive statute concept, i.e., that the remedy is a limitation on the right and that the statutory
time-bar both removes the remedy and extinguishes the right.2 0 This concept has, however, been discarded as a meaningful determinant of whether,
or under what circumstances, the limitation period may be extended. 2'
A "jurisdictional" interpretation of the limitation provision where the
suit involves waiver of sovereign immunity is often used, as in the principal
case, to rationalize construction of the time-bar as an absolute condition.22
However, upon close scrutiny it is readily apparent that this is merely
another version of the substantive statute theory. The only difference between the two is that the remedy is said to condition the jurisdiction rather
than the right of action. In any event this argument is unconvincing in
Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are
not to be implied." Soriano v. United States, supra at 276.
16 See Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959).
17

Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965); accord, Mldstate Horti-

cultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 320 U.S. 356 (1943).

18 Northern Metal Co. v. United States, 350 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1965); accord, Nager
Elec. Co. v. United States, 368 F.2d 847 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (alternative holding), Conn v.
United States, 366 F.2d 1019 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (alternative holding); cf. Kinman v. United

States, 139 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1956). Contra, States Marine Corp. v.United States,
283 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1960); Gray v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 313 (1958). See generally
Huffcut, Statutes of Limitation and Disputes Clauses in Government Contracts, PaAc. LAW,
May 1962, P. 91.
19 It was first held that not even the fraud of the defendant could extend the statutory
time. Damiano v. Pennsylvania R.R., 161 F.2d 534 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 762
(1947); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 108 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1940).
20 See, e.g., Peters v. Hanger, 134 Fed. 586, 588-89 (4th Cir. 1904); American R.R. v.
Coronas, 230 Fed. 545 (1st Cir. 1916).
21 Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1965) (the distinction be-

tween substantive and procedural statutes of limitation does not determine whether or
when the limitation period may be extended); cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co., 326 F.2d 575, 579 (9th Cir. 1964); Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pac.
Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271, 283 (8th Cir. 1962).
22 See, e.g., Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 273 (1957); States Marine Corp. v.
United States, 283 F.2d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1960).
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that it makes a narrow legalistic distinction between two types of statutes
of limitation and assumes that by virtue of this distinction that one may
be tolled while the other may not. Such an assumption seems conclusory
at best. 23 The fact that the remedy conditions the jurisdiction does not
explain why an extention of the remedy should not be allowed. Mortover,
each type of statute, whether it is called procedural, substantive or jurisdictional still falls into the category of a statute of limitation. Since all statutes
of limitation are based on essentially the same assumptions2 ' they should
be subject to similar interpretation.
The courts have, as a rule, been reluctant to read an exception into a
statute of limitations unless required to do so by necessity.2- The better
reasoning would reject such an approach when the result would be unreasonable and plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a
whole.2 6 As in the construction of statutes generally, the aim in construing
an enactment (by Congress) consenting to suit against the United States is
to ascertain the legislative intent and give it effect.2 7 This intention should
be determined by examining the purposes and policies which underlie
the limitation provision and the statute of which it is a part.
The Tucker Act evinces a liberal purpose to provide for expeditious and
orderly determination of claims against the Government and to relieve
Congress of the necessity of considering a great number of private bills.2
The legislative history demonstrates a satisfaction with the benefits of
23 Cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Padfic Gas & Elec. Co., 326 F.2d 575, 579 (9th Cir.
1964). The court discusses the analogous substantive-procedural distinction and states that
semantical distinctions unsupported by reason are not to be viewed with favor.
24 Cf. Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 178 F.2d 253, 256 (4th Cir. 1949).
25 See Amy v. Watertown, 130 U.S. 324 (1889) (dictum); Kilian v. Stackpole Sons, Inc.,
98 F. Supp. 500, 505 (M.D. Pa. 1951) (dictum); Zahn v. Taylor, 7 Wis. 2d 60, 95 N.W.2d
771, 773 (1959) (dictum). Exceptions are usually implied only when access to the courts
is physically prevented by war, Hangar v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 WalL) 532 (1867); Osbourne
v. United States, 164 F.2d 767, 769 (2d Cir. 1947); or by some means equally effective in
preventing one from suing seasonably, such as fraud, Scarborough v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 178 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1949); Toran v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 108 F. Supp. 564,
565 (D. Mass. 1952). But see Williams v. United States, 228 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 351 US. 986, rehearing denied, 352 U.S. 860 (1956). In lVilliams, the Court refused
to suspend the time limitation for insanity.
26 Cf. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (dictum), rehearing
denied, 311 US. 724 (1940); United States v. Union Oil Co., 343 F.2d 29, 33 (9th Cir.
*

1965).
27 Cf. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 426 (1965) (dictum); Midstate
Horticultural Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 320 US. 356, 360 (1945) (dictum). See generally
Comment, 14 J. Pun. L. 232 (1965).
28 Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., supra note 27, at 427; see United States v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 310 US. 534,542-43 (1940) (dictum).
29 See H.R. REP. No. 1077, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1886) (Report by Mr. Tucker on the
Tucker Bill).
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previous legislation in this area ao and a general feeling that such benefits
could be made greater by extending the jurisdiction of the courts.81 Recognizing the broad purpose of the bill and the general trend toward increasing the scope of waiver by the United States of its sovereign immunity
from*suit,2 it seems inconsistent to dismiss the question of tolling upon

an artificial categorization of the statute of limitation involved.
The rationale and policies behind statutes of limitation are based primarily on a concept of fairness to the defendant."! The theory is that even
if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to
defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of
84
stale claims eventually should prevail over the right to prosecute them.
A construction which permits tolling during administrative proceedings
imposed by the Government would do no violence to the concepts behind
the limitation provision and would serve to effectuate the liberal purpose
of the Tucker Act. 35
Certainly a decision such as Northern Metal is desirable from the standpoint of sound judicial administration and fairness to the parties involved.8 0
On the other hand, it is questionable whether the courts ought to look
beyond the language of the legislation to impose an unwritten condition
merely to eliminate hardship on the plaintiff or inconvenience to the courts.
The flaw in Northern Metal is not in abandoning the poorly reasoned
traditional approach; rather it is in ignoring a workable, though admittedly
less attractive, solution which remained within the terms of the statute.
The protective suit 7 as an established device to achieve judicial review
30 Id. at 3.
31 Ibid.
32 The broad lines of the trend in waiving the immunity of the United States from suit

appear from the Court of Claims Act, 1855, 10 Stat. 612 (codified in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.); Tucker Act, 1887, 24 Stat. 505 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.);
Patent Infringement Act of 1910, 35 U.S.C. § 68 (1964); Suits in Admiralty Act, 1920, 41
Stat. 525 (codified in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.); Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753,
60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). For a comparable trend in
waiver of sovereign immunity by state governments, see Shumate, Tort Claims Against
State Governments,9 LAw & CONrEMP. PROB. 242 (1942).
33 Northern Metal Co. v. United States, 350 F.2d 833, 838 (3d Cir. 1965) (dictum); cf.
Railroad Telegraphers v. REA, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
34 Id. at 349.
38 It may be argued that the reasons for the existence of a limitation provision do not
appear in the instant case. The appellant effectively gave the government notice by
bringing its claim to the contracting officer within six years of accrual and the administra.
tive proceeding had the effect of preserving all the relevant evidence. See the discussion
of policies and purposes behind the limitation provision and Tucker Act in general as a
reason for tolling the statute in this situation in the Northern Metal Co. case.
36 See Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 363 F.2d 407, 414, 415 (2d Cir. 1966)
(dissenting opinion).
37 The protective suit requires the plaintiff to file suit in district court and obtain a

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss2/8

18

N/A: Recent Decisions

1967]

RECENT DECISIONS

of an administrative determination without engrafting a new disability on
the statute is neither dearly unreasonable nor plainly at variance with the
policy of the legislation as a whole. It is for this reason, though unarticulated in its opinion, that the second circuit has probably achieved the correct result in the instant case.

Wills-CoNSTRUCTIoN-DEvisE OF REALTY TO NAMED HUSBAND AND WIFE
CoNsUrruTs CLAss GiFT WHEN SUCH INTENT IS IMPLIEDLY SHOWN BY LAN-

an action brought for construction of a will,' the trial
court held that the devise to a named husband and wife of certain realty
in fee simple, and a life estate in other property, resulted in a half-interest
to each, such that the wife's death prior to the death of the testatrix caused
a lapse in the devise to her.2 By the terms of the will the life estate was
to expire at the deaths of the husband and wife, and the devisees were
charged with the satisfaction of a mortgage upon the devised fee. a On
appeal, held, reversed. When the language of a will indicates that the
maker of the will looked upon the named devisees as a unit, the disposition
GUAGE op WiL.-In

stay in any case where the question of time is important to the running of the statute of
limitation while administrative appeal is pending. If the decision of the ASBCA proves
unfavorable the plaintiff is already in court and can have a judicial determination of the
issue.
For grounds upon which judicial review of administrative decision can be had, se 41
U.S.C. § 321 (1964), which provides that the decision is final and conclusive unless it is
"fradulent [sic] or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply
bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence."
I The Court of Ordinary in the county of the testators domicile has exclusive probate
jurisdiction in Georgia. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-603 (1933); Jackson v. Sapp, 210 Ga. 134, 135,
iN GEonmZA § 113 (3d ed.
78 S-.E2d 23, 24 (1953); 1 REDFEAtN, WIUts AND AlhmsRATx
1965). But when construction of a will is involved, the Court of Ordinary, upon its own
motion or the motion of one of the parties, must transfer the action to the Superior
Court for determination of the proper construction before proceeding further. GA. Coon
ANN. § 113-1423 (1965); Davis v. Davis, 94 Ga. App. 459, 462, 95 S.E.2d 42, 44 (1956).
2 The testatrix had not provided a residuary clause in the will, and under the trial
court's construction an intestacy existed as to the wife's half-interest in the devise. See
GA. CODE ANN. § 113-813 (1933); Collier v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 206 Ga. 857, 59
S.E.2d 385 (1950); Snellings v. Downer, 193 Ga. 340, 344-45, 18 S.E.2d 531, 533-34 (1942).
But cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-812 (1933). This section provides that living issue of a legatee
who has predeceased his testator are substituted in the place of their ancestor, and no lapse
occurs when the devise is absolute and without a remainder or other limitations. See
also Lawson v. Hurt, 217 Ga. 827, 125 S.E.2d 480 (19629) (wife of testator sole legatee).
3 The devisees were referred to in the will as "George S. and Mrs. Mamie D. Crane"
in several places. With regard to the life estate, the will provided that the remainder
was to go to "The Lanier Home at their deaths." The obligation to satisfy the mortgage
was approximately $4000 "which they will have to continue to pay off."
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is to a class, and not to the several individuals comprising it. Eppes v.
Locklin, 222 Ga. 86, 149 S.E.2d 148 (1966).
4
Since the intent of the testator governs testamentary disposition, the
courts will construe a will to give substance to the supposed intent of the
testator 5 when expressed intent is absent. Generally, it is said that a gift
to a class, as distinguished from a gift to the several individuals who comprise it, results when the beneficiaries of a devise form an entity or unit. 0
4 E.g., Stegeman v. Smith, 67 Ill. App. 2d 451, 214 N.E.2d 597, 601 (1966); In the Matter of
Foster, 411 P.2d 482, 484 (Sup. Ct. Nev. 1966); Stephens v. Stephens, 218 Ga. 671, 18
S.E.2d 208 (1963).
5 E.g., In re Randall, 49 Cal. Rptr. 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1966); In the Matter of Harber,
99 Ariz. 323, 409 P.2d 31, 33 (1965); Giese v. Smith, 195 Kan. 607, 408 P.2d 687, 690 (1965);
ATKINSON, WILLS § 146 (2d ed. 1953). What is often involved, however, is not the
determination of what the testator actually thought, but what he would have thought
had he considered the particular problem at issue. Roberts v. Trustees of Trust Fund
for Town of Tamworth, 96 N.H. 223, 73 A.2d 119, 121 (1950) (dictum); 2 ScoTr, TRusTs
§ 164.1 (1939).
Numerous canons of construction and interpretation have evolved from judicial consideration of wills. See generally ATKINSON, WIu.s § 146 (2d ed. 1953); 4 PAGE, WILLS ch.
30 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1961); RESrATEmENT, PROPErTY §§ 241-48 (1940); Warren, Interpretation of Wills-Recent Developments, 49 HAIv. L. REV. 689 (1936).
6 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 22.4 (Casner ed. 1952). Whether in fact this "unit"
can be considered a "class" depends on whether the testator was "group-minded" with
respect to his beneficiaries. Ibid.
The Restatement of Property recognizes in addition to the above distinction three
significant differences between the effects of a conveyance to single individuals and one
to a class:
(1) the effect of the death of one of the described group prior to the effective date
of the conveyance containing the limitation; (2) the effect of the revocation by codicil of the interest which has been limited by a prior testamentary instrument to
one of the described group; and (3) the ability of the group to acquire new members subsequent to the execution of the conveyance containing the limitation.
RrsATEMENT, PROPERTY, Introductory Note ch. 22, at 1445 (1940). The possibility of
change in the number of beneficiaries is the crucial distinction, the sine qua non, between class gifts and gifts to individuals, and is the essence of the above enumeration.
See id. § 279, comment a. Thus, the actual number included and the composition of the
class are unknown at the time of the gift, but are to be determined at some future time,
with the size of the share of each member to be determined usually by the number of
members of the class at that time. Houston v. Harberger, 377 S.W.2d 673, 678 (rex. Clv.
App. 1964); Lichter v. Bletcher, 266 Minn. 326, 123 N.W.2d 612, 615 (1963). The formulation of this definition apparently originated with Jarman, 1 JARMAN, WILLS § 282 (6th
Am. ed. 1893), and is adopted by Page, 4 PAGE, WILLS § 35.1 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1961). But
this definition has been severely criticized. Cooley, What Constitutes a Gift to a Class,
49 HI iv. L. REv. 903, 925-30 (1936). Cooley's major objection to the formulation is that
it concerns itself with the mode of the gift, and not with the object; and that it presumes
by statement the very issue to be determined by analysis of the evidence. Id. at 926, 92728. He is also disturbed by the vagueness in such terms as "time of the gift" and "at
some future time." Id. at 926. But, as Cooley indicates, the "time of the gift" can only
refer to the time the will is made. Ibid.
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Thus, the preferred construction is that the gift is to the individuals severally when they are specified by name in the will,7 but to a class when the
It is interesting to note that in a more recent edition of Jarman's treatise, a reconsideration of this definition seems to have occurred, and more general definitional considerations are proposed, which are somewhat comparable to the position taken by the
Restatement of Property. Compare 1 JAMIAN, WILLS § 232 (6th Am. ed. 1893), with 1
JARMAN, WIs 448-56 (Jennings-Harper ed. 1951); compare 1 JARMAN, WILs 448-56 (Jen.
nings-Harper ed. 1951), with REsTAT ET, PROPERTY, Introductory Note ch. 22, at 1445
(1940). However, despite the criticism of the definition, it is generally applied in American courts and, despite its drawbacks, seems serviceable when not rigidly adhered to. See
Lichter v. Bletcher, supra; Cooley, supra at 925 n.77.
The difficulty first enumerated by the REsTATE MENT, PROPERTY, supra, in distinguishing
class gifts from gifts to individuals concerns the death of one of the beneficiaries prior
to the date the conveyance is to take effect When the gift is determined to be to an
individual, the death of the individual before the death of his testator results in a lapse
in the devise to him, in the absence of an applicable lapse statute. See Lawes v. Lynch,
6 NJ. 1, 76 A.2d 885 (1950); 5 AmmRUcAN IAw or PROPERTY § 22.4, at 252 (Casner ed.
1952). On the role played by lapse statutes, see generally 5 A mmuCAN LAw OF PRoErY
§§ 21.26-21.30 (1952). But when the gift is determined to be to a class, the share of the
predeceased beneficiary is shared by the remaining members of the class and there is no
lapse. See, e.g., In the Matter of Haney, 174 Cal. App. 2d 1, 344 P.2d 16 (1959); 5 AMEmic,N LAw OF PROPERTY § 22.4, at 252 (Casner ed. 1952). In this respect a revocation of the
interest of a beneficiary by codicil would have the same effect as if he had died prior
to the date the conveyance took effect, with the disposition of his share being determined
by the manner in which the court construed the gift. Ibid.
The ability of the group to change in number obviously means that the group may
either increase or decrease. If the disposition is to "the children of B, deceased," for
example, the class can only suffer diminution. If, however, B in the above example is
still alive, the class membership is subject to either increase or decrease. See generally,
REsTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 279 and comments (1940).
LAw
For general discussion of class gifts and the attendant problems, see 5 A=saRc
OF PROPERTY § 22 (Casner ed. 1952); R-rAmENT, PROPERTY ch. 22 (1940); Casner, Class
Gifts-DefinitionalAspects, 41 COLUm. L. REv. 1 (1941); Casner, Class Gifts-Effect of Fail.ure of Class Member to Survive the Testator, 60 HAiIv. L. REv. 751 (1947); 41 Mici. L.
REv. 749 (1943).
7 Peadro v. Peadro, 400 Ill 482, 81 N.E.2d 192, 196 (1948) (dictum); 5 AmmrcA LAw
OF PROPERTY § 22.5 (Casner ed. 1952); see, e.g., Tabor v. National Bank of Commerce, 351
S.W.2d 126, 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Buffington v. Mason, 527 Mass. 195, 97 N.E.2d 538,
540 (1950). A provision that the named persons shall share and share alike, or the use
of a similar provision, is often considered as supporting the gift-to-individuals construction. See, e.g., Lawes v. Lynch, supra note 6, at 888; In re Hogarth's Estate, 155 Misc.
734, 279 N.Y. Supp. 189 (Surr. Ct. 1935); cf. Roberts v. Trustees of Trust Fund for Town
of Tamworth, 96 N.H. 223, 73 A.2d 119, 122 (1950) (absence of provision supports class gift
construction). Where particular portions or shares are separately and specifically assigned
to the named individuals, the construction preference in favor of the individual gift construction is so strong as to be almost conclusive. See, e.g., In re Bogardus' Will, 5 Misc.
'2d 607, 164 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Surr. Ct. 1957); Buffington v. Mason, supra 11 at 540.
Even though named individuals are also referred to in general terms, such as a group
indication of relationship to the testator or another, the constructive preference in favor
of a gift-to-individuals is not overcome, in the absence of indications of contrary intent.
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beneficiaries are designated by a group-term. 8 However, the construction
preference that the gift is to the individual beneficiaries is not overcome
by the inclusion of a group-term, 9 or the word "jointly,"' 0 with the individual names. But contrary evidence of the testator's intent, such as a
See Black v. Gettys, 238 S.C. 167, 119 S.E.2d 660 (1961) (half-income from trust to
named children); Young v. Whisler, 19 Ill. 2d 501, 167 N.E.2d 191 (1960) (two of four
children named took all); Jorgenson v. Pioneer Trust Co., 198 Ore. 579, 258 P.2d 140
(1953) ("to my sons," thereafter named); In re Ford's Estate, 201 Misc. 198, 108 N.Y.S.2d
715 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 281 App. Div. 680, 117 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1951) (devise
to testatrix's counsins); Liebhardt v. Avison, 123 Colo. 338, 229 P.2d 938 (1951) (devise
to testator's nephews); In re Sullivan's Estate, 31 Cal. App. 2d 527, 88 P.2d 225 (1939)
(devise to testator's named brothers and sisters).
When the beneficiaries are not named but mentioned by number and class designation,
e.g., "the seven children of X," the numerical specification is often held equivalent to
naming, and class-gift construction fails. See, e.g., Davis v. Mercantile Trust Co., 206 Md.
278, 111 A.2d 602 (Ct. App. 1955) (illegitimate child of nephew not included in bequest);
Landrum v. National City Bank, 210 Ga. 316, 80 S.E.2d 300 (1954) (devise to "my three
sisters'). But see, Adams v. Simpson, 358 Mo. 168, 213 S.W.2d 908 (1948) (enumeration
disregarded to effectuate class gift construction); cf., In re Ziegler's Estate, 356 Pa. 93, 51
A.2d 608 (1947) (class gift to "my six children" and their heirs).
8 E.g., In the Matter of Haney, 174 Cal. App. 2d 1, 344 P.2d 16, 23 (1959); In re Wood's
Estate, 321 Pa. 497, 184 AtI. 13, 15 (1936); see 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 22.9
(Casner ed. 1952). An indication by use of a group-term that certain persons are to be
substituted for the primary taker in case of his death is usually held to be a class gift
as to the substituted group. See, e.g., Tiehen v. Hebenstreit, 152 Neb. 753, 42 N.W.2d
802 (1950) (to "children" of primary taker should he die); Smyth v. McKissick, 222 N.C.
644, 24 S.E.2d 621 (1943) (to children of deceased remainderman). As long as the grouping is natural, the nature of the group specified seems immaterial to the determination
of whether a class gift was made. See Landrum v. National City Bank, 210 Ga. 316, 80
S.E.2d 300 (1954) ("to my nieces'); Cahill v. Cahill, 402 Ill. 416, 84 N.E.2d 380 (1949)
(remainder to life tenant's "Heirs of Blood"); In re Taylor's Estate, 357 Pa. 120, 53 A.2d
136 (1947) (to "issue" in remainder); Martin v. Gray, 209 Ark. 841, 193 S.W.2d 485 (1946)
(to brothers and sisters of testatrix and spouse); Hill v. Birmingham, 131 Conn. 174, 38
A.2d 604 (1944) (trust income to grandchildren); Ireland v. Hudson, 96 Colo. 240, 41
P.2d 237 (1935) (bequest to "employees" of corporation).
The personal intimacy of the testator with the beneficiaries may be such as to set the
beneficiaries apart from others, and has been relied on in support of a class gift construction. See, e.g., Krog v. Hafka, 413 Ill. 290, 109 N.E.2d 213 (1952); Jennings v. Newman, 350 Mo. 276, 221 S.W.2d 487 (1949). The indicated purpose of the testator to
exclude certain persons, who would take from the disposition if a partial Intestacy occurred, has been somewhat relied upon in support of a class gift construction. See, e.g.,
Strauss v. Strauss, 363 Ill. 442, 2 N.E.2d 699 (1936); cf. Holloway v. Burke, 336 Mo. 380,
79 S.W.2d 104 (1936). But see, Schoenberg v. Lodenhemper's Ex'rs, 314 Ky. 105, 234 S.W.2d
501 (1950); In re Penrose's Estate, 183 Misc. 226, 47 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Surr. Ct. 1944).
9 Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Smoot, 135 F. Supp. 654, 657-58 (D.D.C. 1955); Black v. Gettys,
238 S.C. 167, 119 S.E.2d 660, 665 (1961); In the Matter of Estate of Conklin, 139 Cal. App.
2d 532, 293 P.2d 794 (1956); 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 22.6 (Casner ed. 1952).
10 In re Estate of Carter, 203 Iowa 603, 213 N.W. 392, 394 (1927); cf. Mustain v. Gardner, 203 Ill. 284, 67 N.E. 779 (1903) (use of "jointly" doesn't presume joint tenancy).
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common scheme of disposition, 1 can overcome either construction preference. 12 And although the individually named beneficiaries may in fact
exhaust the membership of a group or "class," such evidence has been held
insufficient to overcome the construction preference that the gift is to the
individuals separately.' 3 This position is particularly strong when the
beneficiaries are not members of a "natural" class.'- Thus, where a testator
devised one-thirtieth of his estate as personalty to two named individuals
who were husband and wife, the court held that the couple took as tenants
in common, such that the wife's death prior to that of the testator resulted
15
in a lapse in the devise to her.

In reaching its decision in the instant case, the court was of the impression that the manner in which the beneficiaries were specified in the will,
i.e., "George S. and Mamie D. Crane," indicated that the testator was de10
It is unclear
scribing all those who came within the class "Crane."
1. Eg., Lichter v. Bletcher, 266 Minn. 326, 123 N.W.2d 612 (1963) (half of estate testatrix's relatives, half to husband's); Leo v. Armington, 74 R.L 297, 60 A.2d 475 (1948)
(class gift-from taker to named groups to charity); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Treadwel
312 Mass. 214, 43 N.E.2d 777 (1942) (Class gift-three nieces take income after father's
death).
12 The cases cited in notes 10 and 11 supra apply to overcoming the construction
preference that the gift was to the individual beneficiaries. It is conceivable, however,
that a testator could distribute his estate "to my children, and if any dies before me, his
share will go to the residuary legatee," or otherwise to beneficiaries as a group, but with
an indication that the share of a predeceased beneficiary ivas to lapse. In such a c.se the
courts should have no trouble in finding that a gift to the individual beneficiaries, rather
than to a class, resulted. Similarly, a devise "to my children, the older to take the
meadowlands, while the younger is to have the remainder" would be analogous to the
inclusion of a group term with the names of individuals (see note 10 supra), and should
dearly be treated as a gift to the beneficiaries severally.
13 Eg., Lee v. Foley, 224 Miss. 684, 80 So. 2d 765 (1955). The "natural grouping" in
this case was that the beneficiaries were children of the testator. rd. at 766; accord,
Church v. Gibson, 286 S.W.2d 91 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956). In Church the court held that a
devise of a life estate to one of testators cousins, with the remainder to vest in three
other cousins and a fourth party of her children, if she predeceased the primary beneficiary, did not result in a class gift to a class as regards the remainder. Ibid. See also
5 AMsmucAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 22.6 (Casner ed. 1952). Contra, e.g., Shannon v. Eno,
120 Conn. 77, 179 At. 479 (1935); Thompson v. Martin, 281 Mass. 41, 183 N.E. 51 (1932).
In Shannon the court considered that the presence of a gift over in the event of the
death of one of the legatees tended to support the individual gift construction. Ibid.
14 See, e.g., In re Seaman's Estate, 196 Misc. 202, 91 N.Y.S.2d 854 (Surr. Ct. 1949);
Upton v. White, 92 N.H. 221, 29 A.2d 126 (1942).
15 Damron v. Mast, 121 N.J. Eq. 489, 191 AtL 467 (1937).
16 Eppes v. Locklin, 222 Ga. 86, 89, 149 S.E.2d 148 (1966).
In holding that the devise was a class gift, the court probably took the only method
apparently available to it to avoid an intestacy as there was no residuary clause in the
will, Eppes v. Locklin, supra at 87, 149 S.E.2d at 150, and joint tenancies have been
abolished in Georgia. GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1002 (1933). Any such simultaneous posesmion of
property is to be treated as a tenancy in common. GA. CODE ANNS. § 85-1001 (1933). Although
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whether the court meant to stress the particular phraseology in so arguing,

though it is difficult to see how this phraseology should be accorded more
weight than "George S. Crane and Mamie D. Crane," or some other similar
expression, since the naming of the beneficiaries in either manner should
be construed as a gift to individuals under traditional notions. 17
The instant court also emphasized the implications of the language by

which the beneficiaries were made responsible for the mortgage on the
devised fee: "they will have to continue to pay [it] off."1u Although it has

been held that an obligation imposed upon beneficiaries together entitles
them to share mutually in the gift to which the obligation is attached, 19
the instant language, considered by itself, is as readily susceptible to an
opposite interpretation. If the gift was indeed to the husband and wife as

individuals, a pro rata responsibility for satisfaction of a part of the mortgage debt would be upon each. The word "they" could as readily be construed to favor this apportionment as a class gift construction.

Thus, the only language in the will that somewhat supports the court's
position is that which specifies that the life estate bequeathed to husband
and wife passes to the remainderman "at their deaths," 20 As the court
points out, the law favors a construction that avoids an intestacy;21 the
no specific mention of tenancies by the entirety is made in the statutes, the Supreme
Court of Georgia has stated:
(P)erhaps the statute of this state, which turned estates by joint tenancy Into ten.
ancy [sic] in common, may, by a liberal construction, as it abolished the doctrine
of survivorship in such estates, be held also to extend to estates to husband and wife
and to abolish survivorship in such estates as this, and thus to alter the English
law as to this wife's interest as survivor in all this land. It does not in terms do
so, but its spirit probably does, and so it has been intimated in some of the opinions
of this court.
Parrott v. Edmundson, 64 Ga. 332, 335 (1879). The court in the instant case does not
specifically address itself to this problem, but the outcome indicates that the court must
have impliedly favored the reasoning in the Parrott case. See Eppes v. Locklin, supra at
88, 149 S.E.2d at 150.
17 See cases cited notes 7, 13, 14, 15 supra.
18 See Eppes v. Locklin, 222 Ga. 86, 88, 149 S.E.2d 148, 151 (1966).
19 Bolles v. Smith, 39 Conn. 217 (1872); see Chase v. Peckham, 17 RI. 385, 22 AtI. 285
(1891). In the Chase case the bequest in a residuary clause was to six named nephews,
share and share alike, but they were charged with settling the testator's debts, funeral
expenses, and the expenses incurred through execution of the will. The court held that
the obligation imposed was joint, thereby indicating the group-mindedness of the testator, such that the share of one of the class who predeceased the testator went into
the residue.
The Georgia court cited Chase in the instant case, relying on the joint-obligation
argument to support its class-gift construction. See Eppes v. Locklin, 222 Ga. 86, 89-90,
149 S.E.2d 148, 151 (1966).
20 Id. at 88, 149 S.E.2d at 151.
21 See In re Paulsen's Estate, 158 P.2d 186, 190 (Colo. 1945); 5 RSTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 243, comment to clause (a) (1940). This presumption against partial intestacy, however,
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fact that the testatrix executed a will indicates a desire on her part to avoid

intestacy. As the court reasoned, if the gift were devised to the husband
and wife as individuals, the lapse of the wife's legacy when she predeceased the testatrix, would result in an intestacy as to her share in the
life estate, since, according to the court, the remainderman could not take
until the death of both the husband and wife.2 Although it is unlikely

that the testatrix intended or would favor such a result, it does not necessarily follow therefrom that "at their deaths" precludes any but a class
gift construction. In much the same way that the language relative to the
mortgage obligation was not inconsistent with a gift-to-individuals construction, "at their deaths" could be construed to mean that a half-interest
passed to the remainderman at the death of the first beneficiary, with the
enjoyment of only the second half being postponed till the death of the
other party.
Even granting that the court's interpretation of "at their deaths" to
mean strictly the death of both was correct, the aggregate evidence of a
class gift is insufficient to overturn the traditional construction preference
in favor of a gift-to-individuals. Though the court's attempt to avoid an
intestacy regarding the wife's half-interest is laudable, the availability of
a construction of "at their deaths" which would not have been inconsistent
with a gift-to-individuals demonstrates the unfeasability of the court's

rationale.
It is suggested, however, that the application of the traditional construction preference of a gift to named individuals is inappropriate when the
beneficiaries are husband and wife. In the first place, it is probable that
when a testator names a husband and wife together in a will as beneficiaries he is thinking of them as a unit. The average individual normally
associates a husband with his wife in such a context, and vice versa, and
in the absence of a showing of contrary intent, the construction preference
in such cases should be in favor of a gift to the married unit.
Secondly, there is no convenient term to indicate the testator's groupmindedness in respect to a husband and wife. If, rather than using names,
the testator were to devise to "my nephew and his wife," grouping is no
more indicated than if the names were given. To make a bequest to "the
A.B. Smith family," for example, would also be inadequate for this purpose, since it would be unclear whether the testator intended only the immediate members of the A.B. Smith family or intended the inclusion of
collateral members. However, the phrase "the married couple, A.B. Smiths"
would perhaps be sufficient. But even if there were no question of identifiis readily overcome when the court would have to construe a gift to named individuals
as a class gift to avoid intestacy. See, e.g., Damron v. Mast, 121 N.J.Eq. 489, 191 Ad. 467,
471-72 (1937) (dictum). See also Fass v. Blaty, 55 A.2d 458, 459 (N.J.Eq. 1937) (dictum).
22 Eppes v. Locklin, 222 Ga. 86, 88-89, 149 S.E.2d 148, 151 (1966).
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cation, the phrase is so awkward that it probably would not occur to the
testator. Furthermore, if the testator or his draftsman is aware of the legal
problems inherent in a devise to husband and wife, the inclusion of a
phrase indicating that the couple were to be treated as a class would be
the logical and most probable way to avoid confusion. In the absence, then,
of any likely term to effectively "group" a husband and wife, and considering the probability that the testator looked upon the couple as a unit, the
intent of the testator is more likely followed by favoring a construction
that treats the devise as a class gift.
Since constructions that allow joint-tenancies are generally in disfavor
at the present time, 23 what is here suggested will achieve the same result
as did tenancies by the entirety in those states where the testator's intent
could in no other manner be effectuated. As with the construction preferences in other situations, 24 clear evidence of a contrary intent through a
general scheme of disposition or language in the will2 r should overcome
the preference that the gift was to an entity. Placement of the name of
one spouse in one place in the will, while the name of the other is elsewhere mentioned, should be sufficient evidence to overcome the preference,
since the concept of unity upon which the preference rests is thereby
destroyed.
Though perhaps the husband-wife entity can not be considered a "class"
in the traditional legal cognizance of that word, no reason of policy militates against a similar treatment by the courts in this limited instance.
And though it is admittedly a legal fiction to designate the husband-wife
entity as a "class," no confusion need result if the application of the suggested construction preference is properly limited by the courts. Seen in
this light, then, the result reached by the Georgia court is consistent with
the application of this construction preference. Thus, the court correctly
ruled that the husband, as the surviving member of the class, received the
portion of the devise that would have gone to his wife.
23 RESrATEMhENT, PRoPERTY ch. 22, p. 1445 (1940). For a discussion of the earlier construction preferences at common law in regard to joint tenancies, tenancies by the
entirety, and tenancies in common, see Damron v. Mast, 121 N.J.Eq. 489, 191 AtI. 467, 471
(1937). The court in Damron stated that the old English rule was that a bequest to husband

and wife, whether of realty or personalty, was presumed to create a tenancy by the
entirety, unless evidence of a contrary intent was shown. The court goes on to say, how-

ever, that under the current presumptions as they have evolved a tenancy by the entirety is still (1937) favored when the bequest is of realty; but when the legacy is one
of personalty to a husband and wife, a construction that the gift created a tenancy In
common is favored. Ibid.
24 See text accompanying notes 7, 8 and notes 7 and 8 supra.
25 See notes 11 and 12 supra.
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